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I will now briefly and schematically present my understanding of the existing state ofthe relevant law, then quickly summarize the developments since the 
Gulf War - the immediate trigger of most of the current interest in this subject 
- and finally indicate where, on the basis of the foregoing, the present law appears 
to be in need of strengthening or other improvement. 
First, a schematic summary of the current state of the law -which, incidentally, 
has not changed significantly since the Gulf War. 
A. Norms governing armed conflict: 
(1) Those prohibiting wanton destruction, which go back to the 1899 and 1907 
Hague Peace Conferences, are embodied in treaties that have been widely 
acceptedl and have been held to be solidly part of customary law that binds even 
those States that are not parties to these agreements. They do not specifically refer 
to the environment but, when observed, largely do protect it and actually 
proscribed most of the environmental abuses committed in the course of the Gulf 
War.2 
(2) Other, more recent humanitarian treaties,3 and some others such as the 
ENMOD Convention,4 specifically require the protection of the environment. 
However, many significant States have not yet become parties to these treaties, 
and their recent vintage and the scarcity of relevant State practice makes it difficult 
to consider them part of customary internationallaw.5 
B. Environmental protection norms: 
(1) Treaties relating to or containing general provisions for environmental 
protection, such as the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea,6 the many 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) conventions regulating the disposal 
of oil in the sea,7 or similar regional conventions such as those relating specifically 
to the Persian Gulf,8 which generally do not specify whether and to what extent 
they are meant to apply to or during military conflicts.9 
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(2) There are some environmental instruments that specifically refer to military 
operations, such as the following provisions of the 1982 World Charter for 
Nature: IO 
5. Nature shall be secured against degradation caused by warfare or other hostile 
activities. 
20. Military activities damaging to nature shall be avoided. 
and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development: 11 
Principle 24 
Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall therefore 
respect intemationallaw providing for protection of the environment in times of 
armed conflict and cooperate in its further development, as necessary. 
The General Assembly also stressed, in a post-Gulf War resolution on 
"Protection of the environment in times of armed conflict", in which it referred 
to applicable provisions of the 1907 Hague and 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977 
Additional Protocol I, the ENMOD Convention, and the Rio Declaration, that: 
destruction of the environment, not justified by military necessity and carried out 
wantonly, is clearly contrary to existing intemationallaw .... 12 
Though these statements, which are merely declarations of leading 
representative international bodies, basically at best constitute international 'soft 
law,' their adoption by the votes or with the concurrence of representatives of a 
large majority of countries lend some weight to the suggestion that they represent, 
if not yet well-established customary law, at least the shape of lege ferenda. 13 
This quick summary suggests that the current shape of the international law 
protecting the environment during armed conflict is not really in very good shape, 
with principal reliance still placed on nearly century-old principles of 
humanitarian law evolved when environmental protection was not yet even a 
glimmer in the consciousness of the international community. 
When legal stocktaking after the GuifWarI4 revealed the somewhat tattered 
nature of this twig of international law, there was at first a good deal of scurrying 
around to see what should be done. Greenpeace and others suggested the 
formulation of a Fifth Geneva Convention on the Protection of the Environment 
in Time of Armed Conflict, and there were corresponding suggestions for the 
establishment of an International Green Cross. IS Fairly soon the matter was taken 
up by both the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) - presumably 
concerned to protect its position as the world's primary humanitarian law 
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organization - and the U.N. General Assembly, which was pleased to defer in this 
complicated and ticklish field to the ICRC.I6 
The Red Cross thereupon held a number of expert meetings, and after 
submitting an interim report to the United Nations in 199211 superseded the latter 
by an excellent definitive one the following year. IS In it, the ICRC in effect rejected 
the formulation of any comprehensive new international instrument and 
suggested instead a number of more modest measures, such as: clarifying the 
relationship between the somewhat similar terminology in the ENMOD 
Convention and in Article 35(3) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions; review of the applicability in armed conflict ofinternational 
environmental law; restriction on the use of mines; protection of cultural sites and 
nature reserves and parks; institutional means of implementing provisions on the 
protection of the environment in times of armed conflict; dissemination of the 
relevant international legal provisions; and the drafting of Guidelines for military 
manuals and instruction -for whi~h purpose it attached a detailed text. I9 The 
General Assembly generally endorsed this approach and in particular the proposed 
Guidelines.20 
Having personally been among those who initially considered that it might be 
best to recodify and expand the existing international law, 21 I must confess that I 
now concede the force of the arguments against such a project. My principal reason 
is that stated yesterday by Mr. Conrad Harper, that because of the need to achieve 
widespread consensus on any new treaty, "the resulting agreement might likely 
resemble a lowest common denominator, decidedly unhelpful in dealing with hard 
cases" and that it might "be a model of ambiguity." It would appear that 
governments are not at present ready to accept significant new obligations in this 
field, and any attempt to press them to do so might indeed be counter-productive. 
In this connection, I would like to recall my experience as the Legal Adviser to 
the 1979-1980 U.N. Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious 
or to have Indiscriminate Effects, which produced the 1980 Convention of the 
same name and the three initial Protocols thereto.22 There I observed to what 
extent the military members of, or advisers to, national delegations almost 
uniformly took the most conservative stance, opposing any restrictions that could 
conceivably in the future inhibit their own countries' actions, even if the proposed 
restrictions - if observed - would be of great protective value to their own troops, 
and the grounds for wishing to remain unrestrained were at best speCUlative. There 
is no reason to expect that the situation would be different at any conference 
convened to draft environmental restrictions on warfare. 
This having been said, I would now like to list a number of proposals-some, 
but not all, already mentioned in the 1993 ICRC report-for improving the current 
state of the relevant law. I will divide these suggestions into those pertaining to 
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the actual conflict (on which most of our discussions so far appear to have focused), 
those relating to the pre-conflict and those to the post-conflict phases - while 
recognizing that, of course, no strict division is possible. 
1. With respect to the conflict or combat phase: 
(a) Encouragement of universal adherence to existing treaties, in particular, the 
1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
(b) Attempts to clarify existing norms, and in particular the terms 
"wide-spread," "long-Iastingllong-term" and "severe," which appear disjunctively 
in the ENMOD Convention and conjuctively in Additional Protocol I and which 
are discussed in the travaux preparatoires of the respective instruments23 - from 
which it appears that no reconciliation of the unfortunately similar terminology 
of these two instruments is possible. 
(c) Clarification of the status of environmental treaties during armed conflict: 
(i) between the parties to such conflict; and (ii) between such parties and neutrals. 
In this connection, it is necessary to examine both the question of the persistence 
of treaty obligations during a state of war between parties thereto,24 and the 
perhaps more fundamental question of whether such treaties are meant to apply, 
fully or partially, during a state ofwarfare.25 In this connection, it may be apposite 
to note that multilateral environmental treaties generally establish erga omnes 
obligations, which two or more parties cannot suspend (except with effect purely 
between themselves) even by agreement - so why should they be able to do so by 
engaging in armed conflict with each other. 
(d) Effective dissemination of the applicable rules to all whose actions or 
decisions might violate them, which can probably be best done by means of 
military manuals such as foreseen in the Guidelines proposed by the ICRC. 
(e) The establishment of an international monitoring organ to function during 
periods of armed conflict, to note, if possible to investigate, and to remind the 
parties concerned of their obligations in respect of environmental protection; such 
functions might, but need not necessarily, be assigned to the International 
Fact-Finding Commission established pursuant to Article 90 of the 1977 
Additional Protocol 1.26 
2. With respect to the pre-conflict phase: 
(a) Attention should be paid to the U.N. General Assembly's 1980 resolution 
on the "Historical responsibility of States for the preservation of nature for present 
and future generations," in which the Assembly, inter alia: 
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2. [Drew] the attention of States to the fact that the continuing arms race has 
pernicious effects on the environment .... 
There is little doubt that military exercises, in particular extensive target 
practice, are destructive of the environment where they take place. Moreover, 
weapons production facilities, such as nuclear facilities in the United States, may 
for various reasons not be subject to as strict environmental controls as other 
industrial enterprises. Much could probably be done to alleviate these situations 
- though obviously a reduction of war preparations would be most beneficial. 
(b) Attention should also be paid to Article 36 of Additional Protocol I, which 
reads as follows: 
Article 36 - New weapons 
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of new weapons, means or 
method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine 
whether its employment would, in some or in all circumstances, be prohibited 
by this Protocol or by any other rule ofinternationallaw applicable to the High 
Contracting Party. 
First of all, it should be noted that this obligation thus encompasses the 
environmentally protective provisions of Articles 35(3), 55 and 56 of the Protocol, 
but also refers to all other such provisions of conventional or customary law, 
whatever their source.27 Second, the methods of determining whether a particular 
new weapon might be unduly offensive to the environment include the by now 
well-established practices of environmental impact assessments28 and the use of 
the precautionary principle29 - which evidently can not easily be applied in 
combat situations but which should be fully applicable in pre-conflict ones. 
(c) The setting of targeting rules and the selection of targets or types of targets 
should, as far as possible, be carried out in advance of a particular armed conflict 
and, in any event, of a particular combat situation, at a level of leadership -
whether military or civilian - where account can appropriately be taken of any 
relevant environmental considerations. Thus, it should not be left to commanders 
of ships to decide whether or not, under certain circumstances (e.g., the 
maintenance of an embargo), tankers maybe targeted. 
3. With respect to the post-conflict phase: 
(a) Some type of international, impartial fact-finding procedure should be 
established to determine to what extent and how the environment has been harmed 
during an armed conflict, and all parties to the conflict should be required to 
co-operate in such an exercise. 
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(b) Procedures should be established for the determination and assessment of 
civil liability on States for the infliction, during a conflict, of undue damage to the 
environment, which damages should be payable to the States damaged or to the 
international community if the damage extends to a res communis. Such liability 
need not necessarily be restricted to the aggressor State, though such a State might 
be required to bear the ultimate burden of any environmental harm caused, as the 
Security Council required oflraq in the GulfWar.30 But as between a neutral in 
a conflict (or the international community) and a participant in a conflict who 
caused improper environmental harm (i.e., harm inconsistent with a legal 
obligation of such State), it would seem proper that the latter rather than the 
former bear the burden - though that is not the current view of the International 
Law Commission.31 
(c) Procedures should be established for the determination of criminal liability 
for individuals and possibly even for States. For the former, the necessary 
institutions could be based on the examples of the ad hoc tribunals that the Security 
Council has established in respect offormer-Yugoslavia32 and Rwanda,33 but a 
more sound foundation would probably be the International Criminal Court now 
under consideration by the General Assembly.34 
As to what constitutes environmental crimes, it should first of all be noted that 
Article 85(5) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I specifies that grave breaches of that 
instrument or of the 1949 Conventions constitute war crimes; however, it does not 
identify breaches of its environmental provisions (Articles 35(3) and 55) as grave 
breaches- although "extensive destruction . . . of property, not justified by 
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly" is so classified by 
Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV and is thus a war crime for parties to the 
Protocol. In addition, the I.L.C. had included in its first reading of the Draft Code 
of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the "employing of methods 
and means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause wide-spread, 
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment" as an "exceptionally 
serious war crime.,,35 
Furthermore, under its work on "State Responsibility," the I.L.C. has 
tentatively classified as a State crime "massive pollution of the atmosphere or of 
the seas,,36 - though the very notion of the criminal responsibility of States has 
recently been seriously questioned in the Commission.37 
(d) Finally, one of the most useful post-conflict environmental measures that 
could be taken would be to make effective provisions for the removal of the 
remnants of war, and especially mines, from erstwhile battlefields. In this 
connection, one might recall a 1982 U.N. General Assembly resolution on 
"Remnants ofWar,,38 that stated, inter alia: 
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Convinced that the responsibility for the removal of the remnants of war should be 
borne by the countries that planted them, 
3. Reiterates its support of the just demands of the States affected by the implantation 
of mines and the presence of the remnants of war on their lands for compensation 
from the States responsible for those remnants .... 
Though there has been no direct foIIow-up of that somewhat isolated 
declaration, it should be noted that immediately after the Gulf War cease-fire the 
Security Council demanded that Iraq: 
Provide all information and assistance in identifying Iraqi mines, booby traps and 
other explosives as well as any chemical and biological weapons and material in 
Kuwait, in areas of Iraq where forces of Member States cooperating with Kuwait 
pursuant to Resolution 678 (1990) are present temporarily, and in adjacent 
waters ..... 39 
Such an obligation, of course, is set out in Protocol II (which deals with land mines) 
of the Inhumane Conventional Weapons Convention.40 
Of greater general and long-term significance is the conference that the United 
Nations organized this July on the Removal of Land Mines, recognizing that this 
may be the most important post-war environmental restoration that can be taken. 
On the other hand, the first Review Conference of the Inhumane Weapons 
Convention, which is inter alia scheduled to consider an extension of Protocol II 
to that instrument, is unlikely to make much progress over the existing provisions 
- for the majority of poorer countries consider simple contact mines to be a 
weapon of choice for those that cannot afford more complex and expensive 
defensive devices, such as the self-destructing mines that would meet the 
requirements of the existing Protocol. 
Arguably, the present Symposium has-true to a narrow construction of its 
title-so far focused too extensively on the protection of the environment during 
actual combat, i.e., in situations where these concerns can least readily be 
accommodated, and thus arouse the greatest anxiety of the military. By contrast, 
the measures that can be taken before a particular conflict arises, and in any event 
before an actual combat operation has begun, and especially those that can be taken 
after the end of the conflict, appear to have been somewhat neglected even though 
they may well be less controversial and more effective. 
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